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A B S T R A C T

While (urban) resilience has become an increasingly popular concept, especially in the areas of disaster
risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA), it is often still used as an abstract metaphor,
with much debate centered on deﬁnitions, differences in approaches, and epistemological considerations. Empirical studies examining how community-based organizations (CBOs) “practice” resilience on
the ground and what enables these CBOs to organize and mobilize around resilience are lacking.
Moreover, in the growing context of competitive and entrepreneurial urbanism and conﬂicting priorities
about urban (re)development, it is unclear how urban development dynamics inﬂuence communitybased resilience actions. Through empirical research conducted on the Lower East Side, a gentrifying
neighborhood in Manhattan, and in Rockaway, a socio-spatially isolated neighborhood in Queens, we
investigate community organizing of low-income residents for (climate) resilience in a post-disaster
context. Results show that both the operationalization of resilience – how resilience is “practiced” – and
the community capacity to organize for the improved resilience of low-income residents are strongly
inﬂuenced by pre-existing urban development dynamics and civic infrastructure – the socio-spatial
networks of community-based organizations – in each neighborhood. The Lower East Side, with its long
history of community activism and awareness of gentriﬁcation threats, was better able to mobilize
broadly and collectively around resilience needs while the more socio-spatially isolated neighborhoods
on the Rockaway peninsula were more constrained.
ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
When Superstorm Sandy hit New York City on October 29th,
2012, 44 people lost their lives, thousands of people were
displaced, and an estimated $19 billion was lost in damages and
economic activity (NYC, 2015). Sandy highlighted the vulnerabilities to climate impacts of low-income communities in New York
City and gave rise to a visible resilience agenda in NYC (Rosenzweig
and Solecki, 2014). Public housing residents were among the
populations disproportionately affected by the storm. Many
buildings owned by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)
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lost electricity, heating or hot water for weeks due to the ﬂooding
of basement-level heating and electrical systems. NYCHA and
other governmental agencies were unable to provide timely and
adequate aid to many stranded residents, which prompted a largescale community-based disaster relief effort (Jaleel, 2013;
Schmeltz et al., 2013). After the emergency relief ended, many
community-based organizations continued their mobilization and
organizing around resilience.
Calls for more climate resilient cities have intensiﬁed over the
last couple of years (Godschalk, 2003; Leichenko, 2011; Pickett
et al., 2004; Rosenzweig et al., 2011). While a growing body of
literature has pointed at the inequitable impacts of climate change
in urban populations (e.g. Dodman and Satterthwaite, 2008;
Hardoy and Pandiella, 2009; Paavola and Adger, 2006), at triggers
and incentives for urban climate adaptation (e.g. Adger et al.,
2005a; Amundsen et al., 2010b), and assessed municipal
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approaches to adaptation planning (e.g. Anguelovski et al., 2014;
Carmin et al., 2012b), more research is needed on the critical
dimensions of adaptation interventions (Shi et al., 2016), especially
interventions planned and implemented under the new buzzword
of (urban) resilience. How do urban community-based organizations respond to municipal actions on resilience, “practice”
resilience on the ground, and balance complex – and at times
conﬂicting – priorities to increase the resilience of low-income
communities? What factors enable and constrain these community-based organizations to organize for resilience?
This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap through the qualitative
analysis of community responses to Hurricane Sandy in two ﬂoodprone, environmentally vulnerable neighborhoods in NYC – The
Rockaways in Queens and the Lower East Side in Manhattan (See
Fig. A1 in Appendix). These two waterfront districts differ
substantially in experiencing the forces of gentriﬁcation that
characterized New York City development since 2000 (NYU
Furman Center, 2016) and in their proximity to the central
business district of Manhattan. Results show that both the
operationalization of resilience – how resilience is “practiced” –
and the community capacity to organize for the improved
resilience of low-income and minority residents are strongly
inﬂuenced by pre-existing urban development dynamics and
degrees of what community development scholars call neighborhood “civic infrastructure” (Lang and Hornburg, 1998). Neighborhoods with a long history of broad-based community activism and
experience with gentriﬁcation’s impacts seem better able to
mobilize broadly and collectively around resilience, while more
socio-spatially isolated neighborhoods lack the civic infrastructure
and collective ability to pursue resilience efforts.
The next section brieﬂy summarizes current debates around
(urban) resilience. Section 3 describes the research design of this
paper. In Sections 4 and 5, we discuss the context of resilience work
and interventions in NYC and analyze our results using a narrative
approach. Section 6 presents some discussion and concluding
remarks.
2. (Urban) resilience: current debates and missing links
Although in recent years the concept of (urban) resilience has
attracted signiﬁcant attention, much of the resilience literature is
still centered on deﬁnitional debates, differences in approaches,
and epistemological discussions (Cutter et al., 2014). Consequently,
the concept is often used as an abstract metaphor or a buzzword
that hides political struggles or socio-spatial tensions (Davoudi
et al., 2012; Stumpp, 2013).
Recent deﬁnitions of resilience have broadened from their roots
in engineering and ecology (Holling, 1996) to include the
opportunities that open up after disturbances in complex systems
(Folke et al., 2005) and to incorporate ideas of adaptation, learning,
and self-organization. Resilience reﬂects the degree to which a
complex, adaptive system is capable of self-organization and can
build capacity for learning and adaptation (Adger et al., 2005b;
Olsson et al., 2004; Smit and Wandel, 2006). It includes
“persistence, recovery and the adaptive and transformative capacities
of interlinked social and ecological systems and subsystems”
(Elmqvist et al., 2013).
Resilience is often considered as the ﬂipside of vulnerability, as
improving the resilience of populations, ecosystems, and infrastructure could contribute to reductions in speciﬁc vulnerabilities. (For an
historical overview of the concept of vulnerability see Adger (2006).
Yet, while some overlap exists between the two concepts (Cutter
et al., 2014; Gallopín, 2006; Miller et al., 2010b; Turner, 2010),
simplifying them as oppositional states (Chelleri et al., 2015)
overlooks the importance of a system’s capacity to self-organize
and adapt to emerging and unpredictable circumstances (Folke,
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2006). In the context of climate change and extreme weather events,
resilience is often seen as related to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)
and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA), especially so in urban areas.
Today, increasing climate impacts are indeed demonstrating the
need for cities to effectively adapt to shifting climate conditions and
be proactive at multiple scales while, at the same time, providing
basic urban infrastructure and service providing functions (Amundsen et al., 2010a).
Many cities are exploring options and paths to best prepare for
climate impacts and risks (Carmin et al., 2012a; Romero-Lankao
and Dodman, 2011). While hazard-based approaches focus on
applying climate change projections to the local scale in order to
identify hazard impacts (Füssel, 2007), vulnerability approaches
tend to examine the socio-economic factors that determine the
sensitivity and coping capacity of urban systems and societies
(Miller et al., 2010a). To an extent, the latter approach sees future
climatic conditions as too uncertain to warrant interventions tied
to particular climatic regimes.
In order to operationalize climate adaptation, many municipalities around the world develop citywide integrated assessments,
with focuses on developing general climate or adaptation plans,
and then subsequently delegate mainstreaming and implementation responsibilities to municipal departments (Carmin et al.,
2012a). Along the process of climate adaptation, civic participation
and partnership building are seen as critical to the accountability
and effectiveness of urban adaptation planning (Anguelovski and
Carmin, 2011; Aylett, 2010; Carmin et al., 2012a; Chu et al., 2015b;
Kithiia and Dowling, 2010; Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2010).
Due to the relative novelty and uncertainties associated with
different climate adaptation planning methodologies, experimentation and creativity characterize the ways in which municipalities
engage in adaptation on the ground (Anguelovski and Carmin,
2011). In practice, they adapt sectoral and land use policies,
infrastructure systems, and urban designs to projected climate
impacts (Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Anguelovski et al., 2014;
Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Chu et al., 2015a). Cities prepare
adaptation interventions, such as ﬂood-protection systems or
wetland restoration projects, within broader economic or social
resilience strategies (Carmin et al., 2013). Second, they update their
building codes, zoning ordinances, land use plans, and capital
investment policies to avoid development in risk-prone areas or to
raise standards for construction (Cutter et al., 2014). Third, they
tend to assess the ability of water or transport infrastructures to
withstand impacts and make “climate prooﬁng” investments that
attempt to provide “win-win” beneﬁts regardless of climate
uncertainties (While and Whitehead, 2013). Following this
strategy, some cities are designing mega-projects involving hard
(such as dikes) or soft (such as green belts) infrastructures
(Sovacool, 2011).
The omission of social, political and cultural dynamics is an
important shortcoming of much resilience thinking (Brown, 2014;
Davoudi et al., 2012). The question of “resilience for whom” and
“for whose interests” is rarely addressed (Cote and Nightingale,
2012; Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011). As a result, emphasizing
“climate prooﬁng” and “win-win” solutions without considering
the distributional impacts of such strategies can reinforce shortterm solutions and patterns of unsustainable and inequitable
development (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Pelling et al., 2014).
Additionally, increasing the resilience of a system at one scale or in
one time period can decrease the resilience at other scales or time
periods or systems (Walker et al., 2004).
There is also a risk that resilience interventions become
privileged and private goods, resulting in exclusionary outcomes
and (environmental) gentriﬁcation in urban distressed neighborhoods (Checker, 2011; Curran and Hamilton, 2012; Dale and
Newman, 2009; Shi et al., 2016), which, in turn, can reduce
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community-level resilience (Pearsall, 2012). Many urban resilience
interventions are indeed inevitably embedded in a context of
competitive and entrepreneurial urbanism and conﬂicting priorities and needs about urban (re)development (Brenner, 2009;
Brownlow, 2006; Harvey, 1989; Peck and Tickell, 2002; While et al.,
2004) For instance, in view of climate risks and impacts, some
adaptation interventions meant to enhance urban resilience
protect economically valuable and already privileged areas at
the expense of disadvantaged neighborhoods, thus framing
adaptation as a private responsibility rather than a public good
(Anguelovski et al., 2016). Adaptation and resilience planning can
be a dual process of favoring certain privileged groups while
simultaneously denying resources and voice to marginalized
communities.
The emerging scholarship on climate resilience has begun to
highlight equity concerns within and across cities associated with
uneven patterns of resilience (Leichenko, 2011). Studies are
increasingly revealing that urban economic investors and municipal leaders may be using climate resilience discourse to exacerbate
or perpetuate unsustainable, speculative, and exclusionary decisions which might reproduce and exacerbate historic inequities
associated with infrastructure and land use development (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Sovacool et al., 2015). These trends reveal how
efforts to include adaptation as a new policy arena might
uncritically align adaptation with private development interests
in ways that undermine the need for deeper reforms and attention
to existing inequalities and marginalization trends (Anguelovski
et al., 2014; Bulkeley and Tuts, 2013; Preston et al., 2015; Simon and
Leck, 2015).
In response, scholars are increasingly arguing that efforts to
incrementally adapt and build or design their way out of the
climate crisis are insufﬁcient to redress socio-spatial disparities.
They are calling for transformative responses to global environmental change (O’Brien, 2012; Pelling et al., 2014) that increase the
scale of interventions, address the drivers of socio-spatial
vulnerability, and fundamentally change economic growth paradigms and class relations (Kates et al., 2012; Pelling et al., 2014;
IPCC, 2014). They are also arguing for urban resilience interventions to incorporate a more critical analysis of inequality and
justice (Archer and Dodman, 2015).
Some cities are already adopting bolder approaches to
resilience planning and climate adaptation by promoting community-based and pro-poor adaptation actions that tackle underlying
drivers of vulnerability, such as poverty, insecurity, insufﬁcient
affordable housing, and inadequate access to social welfare
services (Anguelovski et al., 2011; Bahadur and Tanner, 2014;
Bulkeley et al., 2014; Castán Broto et al., 2013). Yet, to date,
resilience research and practice often lack a consideration of
agency, privileging structural change/stability rather than the
behavior of actors within a changing system (Brown and Westaway, 2011; Matyas and Pelling, 2015).
As a result, it is currently unclear how (urban) resilience is
adopted and “practiced” by the community organizations, groups
and leaders affected by climate impacts. While scholarship on
community-based adaptation (CBA) is offering new insights on
community engagement in and contribution to adaptation
planning, studies are mostly focused on residents and practices
in low and middle-income countries (e.g. Ayers and Forsyth, 2009;
Chu et al., 2015a; Dodman and Mitlin, 2013). On the other hand,
few adaptation or resilience studies pay attention to the broader
dynamics of unequal urban development and real-estate investment when assessing resilience interventions in global cities and
how those impact the behavior of impacted residents and
community groups around them. As such, there is an urgent need
for critical studies on community-based resilience work in
marginalized neighborhoods, and for understanding how

community groups respond to municipal practices of resilience,
take into consideration existing patterns of urban development
and growth dynamics into their resilience organizing, and navigate
the multiple (and often conﬂicting) needs for long-term environmental and social resilience. This study attempts to address these
gaps and contribute to the growing ﬁeld of critical adaptation and
resilience studies.
3. Methods
3.1. Case study design
This paper presents the ﬁndings of a comparative case study of
two critical neighborhoods in New York City with high percentages of
low-income residents (earning less than $20,000 annually) that
were hit by an extreme weather event, Superstorm Sandy: the Lower
East Side and the Rockaways. We selected neighborhoods on
different urban redevelopment paths in order to analyze the
inﬂuence of urban development dynamics on post-disaster resiliency efforts directed at low-income residents and on their ability to
contribute to long-term community resilience in the context of
climate risks. We examined community organizing efforts and
experiences in Rockaway, a socio-spatially isolated neighborhood in
the outer borough of Queens, versus the Lower East Side, a gentriﬁed
neighborhood in downtown Manhattan (See Fig. A1).
The Lower East Side (LES) is a densely populated, multiracial
neighborhood in Lower Manhattan that has experienced several
waves of intense gentriﬁcation (Smith and DeFilippis, 1999). The
Lower East Side, along with the East Village and parts of Chinatown,
comprise Manhattan Community District 3 (CB3), one of 59
community planning districts in NYC, which provide advisory
resident input on planning and land use via appointed Community
Boards in each district. The Lower East Side is the third most dense
district in the city, with good access to the central business district
(CBD) and jobs for those that have them, with a below average
unemployment rate (see Fig. 1 below for select neighborhood
indicators). The LES has a rich history as an immigrant destination in
NYC. Although census tracts suggest micro-patterns of segregation,
the district is one of the most racially and economically diverse in
New York City. More than one in three residents on the LES are
foreign-born. The neighborhood has a wealth of community
organizations serving diverse, low-income populations, frequently
in the face of ﬁerce economic pressures.
From a housing access standpoint, the LES has low home
ownership, few family households, and high rents for newcomers,
among the highest in the city: the median listing price for new
rentals is around $3000/month (NYU Furman Center, 2015). It also
hosts 26 public housing developments with more than 30,000
residents. As a result, its median income is fairly low and its
poverty rate fairly high. As Manhattan gets richer, so does the LES,
albeit unevenly.

Fig. 1. Select Demographic and Housing Indicators, LES & Rockaway.
Sources: American Community Survey, 2009–2013, NYC Planning Commission,
NYU Furman Center 2014 State of the City’s Housing & Neighborhoods.
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In contrast, as one of the least populated and dense districts in
NYC, the Rockaways is far from the central business district and
“suburban,” reﬂecting its porous eastern border with neighboring
Long Island towns. “The Rockaways” (a.k.a. “Rockaway”) is a
collection of neighborhoods situated on a peninsula in Southern
Queens between Jamaica Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. Along with
Broad Channel, a small community built over Jamaica Bay,
Rockaway constitutes Queens Community Board 14. Its beloved
boardwalk on one of the nation’s largest public beaches was
severely damaged by Sandy. Rockaway has endured substantial
economic stagnation since the late 20th century as its tourism
sector declined; however a so-called “hipster economy” was
emerging prior to Sandy following the legalization of surﬁng in
NYC. Sandy has further rejuvenated local economic development,
with new retail and nightlife options, bringing increased attention
to the district (see, for example, Higgins, 2016).
Like the LES, the Rockaways has high racial and economic
diversity at the district level. Yet, patterns of racial/ethnic and
economic segregation in Rockaway are more geographically
pronounced than in the LES. The peninsula’s “West End” houses
mostly white (78%) homeowners (58%) in single-family homes. By
contrast are the multi-racial demographics of the “East End,”
where three-quarters of the district lives, mostly in large multifamily buildings (See East End indicators in Fig. 1).
During the 20th century, its abundance of inexpensive land and
relatively low population density led the city to site a disproportionate share of institutional properties in Rockaway, including the
vast majority of Queens’ public housing. Today, the Rockaways has 6
public housing developments, all on the East End. The East End’s
“urban” challenges of low homeownership (27%) and higher poverty,
unemployment and lack of access to opportunity are obscured by the
dominance of older, white, single-family homeowners from the West
End in Community Board 14 activism and recovery politics.
Rockaway and the LES are among the most ﬂood prone districts
in NYC, with 84% and 33% of housing units, respectively, in the
FEMA ﬂood plain. Both districts were hit by storm surges from
Sandy in excess of 10 feet. Throughout the city, 80,000 NYCHA
residents – many of those in the Rockaways and the Lower East
Side – lost essential services, with more than 400 different
buildings losing heat and/or (hot) water (NYCHA, 2013; NYU
Furman Center, 2013). For some buildings it took up to 12 weeks to
have basic services running again, and some developments are
currently still running on temporarily boilers.
Both areas received signiﬁcant media, organizational, and
volunteer attention in the aftermath of Sandy. In 2014, Mayor Bill
de Blasio took ofﬁce with housing recovery programs stalled after a
year of missteps and endless frustration for Sandy-affected homeowners. He also faced a restive and anguished public housing
population in the Rockaway and LES, living in buildings powered by
temporary boilers with major backlogs of repairs, sporadic heat and
hot water, and growing mold and mildew problems. Yet, since Sandy,
this population together with its organizational allies city-wide have
articulated a common post-Sandy struggle against NYCHA and the
City for recovery assistance (Weathering the Storm, 2013).
3.2. Data collection and analysis
This research is based on intensive ﬁeldwork from January 2013
through June 2015, with participant-observation, in-depth interviews and documentary and archival research occurring in two
stages. First, we conducted participant-observation in recovery
politics in Rockaway from January 2013 through June 2014,
attending community board and other public meetings focused on
the planning and reconstruction of the Rockaway Boardwalk, open
space, housing, the beach, and local infrastructure. In addition we
conducted 48 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 40
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residents and 8 advocates and practitioners across the peninsula,
asking about experiences with government recovery programs,
and their visions for the peninsula as recovery dollars began to ﬂow
into the region. We used a snowball sample originating with
Community Board 14 members in order to trace grassroots
networks across the district. Our interviews included tenant
leadership from ﬁve of the six NYCHA developments in Rockaway.
As we began to analyze the data from Rockaway, the inﬂuence
of the peninsula’s segregation and its modest pre-storm economic
development on local recovery priorities stood out. We knew from
prior research that vulnerable community members are often left
worse off in post-disaster redevelopment efforts, and that these
efforts often build on pre-disaster development trends (Graham,
2007, 2012a, 2012b). We recognized that Sandy recovery had
accelerated an emerging municipal focus on resilience (Navarro,
2012; A Stronger, More Resilient New York, 2013), inﬂuencing
rebuilding priorities. Finally, Sandy struck near the end of Mayor
Bloomberg’s third term, an era spanning the 2000s and one
characterized by substantial gentriﬁcation (NYU Furman Center,
2016) and widening income inequality – trends often viewed as
linked to Bloomberg’s commitments to urban sustainability
(Flegenheimer, 2015) and rebuilding NYC as an international
destination after 9/11 (Greenberg, 2008). As Mayor de Blasio took
over recovery efforts, we recognized an opportunity to investigate
how different low-income Sandy-affected communities in neighborhoods on two different urban development paths were
responding to this pivot from urban sustainability to resilience
(see Section 4.1) in a city patterned by divergent but widespread
experiences with gentriﬁcation.
Therefore, we conducted a second round of interviews and
participant-observation on the Lower East Side, given its demographic similarities with Rockaway but its differences due to
gentriﬁcation, proximity and a stronger civic infrastructure historically and culturally. For this comparative analysis we relied on a subsample of interviews (28) that included public housing residents,
social service providers, and other community leaders focused on the
recovery of the Rockaways’ East End and its impacts on low-income
and public housing tenants. Then, from January through May 2015,
we conducted 20 semi-structured interviews in the LES and
Rockaway, and with city-wide advocates, and attended 13 community meetings. We selected interviewees to cover the entire range of
respondents with a stake in or involved in post-Sandy community
organizing. Interview questions were related to community
organizing for disaster preparedness and resilience before, during
and after Superstorm Sandy, the work that these organizations are
currently engaged in, and possible tensions that arise from resilience
action. All interviews were analyzed through thematic coding
concerning shifts in community-based activity pre- and post-Sandy,
rationales behind how resilience is operationalized, and tensions,
factors, and dynamics inﬂuencing resilience practice.
In both settings, we also tracked planning and redevelopment
efforts through agency documents (e.g., NYC Parks & Recreation,
NYC Economic Development Corporation, Mayor’s Ofﬁce of
Sustainability, Mayor’s Ofﬁce Recovery and Resiliency, NYCHA),
key NGO reports and briefs (e.g., Alliance for a Just Rebuilding), and
in local media (e.g., The New York Times, Capital New York, DNA Info)
to better understand the city-wide context of sustainability and
resilience planning.
4. Community organizing for resilience on the Lower East Side
and in Rockaway
4.1. Municipal and state resilience efforts in New York
Urban sustainability was a signature priority of Mayor
Bloomberg’s three terms in ofﬁce, enshrined most notably in his
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PlaNYC, an environmental sustainability blueprint for New York,
and in the Ofﬁce of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, a
permanent new ofﬁce charged with its implementation. Bloomberg’s commitment to urban sustainability was motivated by
population growth projections for NYC. Therefore, a priority in
Bloomberg’s sustainability agenda was land-use planning, especially by rezoning underutilized land, of which a signiﬁcant portion
was along the city’s 502-mile waterfront. (Relevant to this analysis,
58% of Rockaway’s land had “unused zoning capacity,” versus 25%
on the LES, impacting their rezoning potential in Bloomberg’s
sustainable development efforts (NYU Furman Center, 2015)). As
scientists released estimations of the substantial risks to NYC from
sea level rise and increased ﬂooding due to climate change,
Bloomberg’s reliance on waterfront development to meet the
demands of population growth in NY ran headlong into smart
practices for “sustainable growth” like shoreline retreat in the face
of sea level rise.
As such, and particularly after the near-miss in 2011 of
Hurricane Irene’s potential damage to NYC, the Bloomberg
Administration began “pursuing a so-called resilience strategy.”
This strategy aimed to improve “the city’s ability to weather the
effects of serious ﬂooding and recover from it” and attempted to
address environmental justice activists’ concerns about lowincome residents’ proximity to toxic facilities and land and the
Administrations’ neglect of “disaster planning” (Navarro, 2012).
Hurricane Sandy accelerated the city’s modest embrace of the
concept of resiliency, with the storm raising “the bar” for NYC
beyond the “forward-looking resiliency initiatives” initially laid
out in PlaNYC in 2007 (A Stronger, More Resilient New York, 2013).
After Sandy, Mayor Bloomberg launched the Special Initiative for
Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR) to plan “additional protection”
from “the impacts of climate change.” SIRR utilized a risk-reduction
framework that focused on adaptation to climate change and
mitigation of its impacts in a coastal city unwilling to retreat from
prior commitments to waterfront development.
In 2014, newly elected Mayor De Blasio created the NYC Mayor’s
Ofﬁce for Recovery and Resilience (ORR), charged with overseeing
and implementing the SIRR report’s initiatives, as part of his
Administration’s overhaul and continuation of Bloomberg’s postSandy recovery efforts. Today, the Mayor’s Ofﬁce of Long-Term
Planning and Sustainability and the ORR co-lead the city’s
“sustainability and resiliency initiatives” laid out in de Blasio’s
OneNYC plan, which replaced PlaNYC in 2015 and prioritizes
reducing income inequality. In announcing OneNYC, de Blasio
emphasized that “environmental sustainability and economic
sustainability have to walk hand in hand,” a perspective consistent
with his campaign promise to ﬁght inequality. Encapsulating a
common criticism of Bloomberg’s sustainability efforts in a city
patterned by rising housing costs and income inequality, de Blasio
also remarked, “A beautifully sustainable city that is the
playground of the rich doesn’t work for us” (Flegenheimer, 2015).
Chronicling disaster recovery efforts is a delicate endeavor, as
recovery is a chaotic, uneven process of “money ﬂying in every
direction,” (Tierney, quoted in Graham, 2007) with community
populations unevenly connected to different initiatives. Although
it is beyond the scope of this analysis to explore all of NYC and NYS’
post-Sandy efforts, we acknowledge several here to contextualize
the community resilience work in this analysis. Since 2012, NYC’s
post-Sandy efforts are nested within a network of federal, state,
and philanthropic recovery initiatives, including:
 The “Big U”, a large multipurpose grey and green infrastructure
project designed to ﬂood-proof the Lower Manhattan waterfront
and offer a waterfront recreational park for residents, was a
winner of the federally-sponsored “Rebuild by Design”

competition. It brings federal implementation funds to the city
for its “East Side Coastal Resiliency” (ESCR) project.
 The Rockaway Boardwalk reconstruction, funded by FEMA and
led by the NYC Economic Development Corporation, with beach
replenishment led by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
 NYCHA efforts to storm proof 33 developments, paid for by a
FEMA grant, including elevating boilers and installing ﬂood
barriers and back-up generators.
Indeed, Hurricane Sandy recovery in NYC and New York State
enjoyed substantial investment and coordinated public-private
support due to the political power, expertise and capacity situated
in the city and state (Schuerman and Gurian, 2014). As such, the
extent of post-Sandy resilience initiatives were much broader than
efforts initiated by ORR, which served to reinforce communitylevel perspectives that “resilience” was the new governing modus
operandi in a post-Sandy era, as evidenced by billions in federal,
municipal and philanthropic funds, and by the political priorities of
the urban and political elite.
Important geographic, political, and socioeconomic differences
in the Lower East Side vs. the Rockaways created diverse
experiences with municipal resilience efforts. Post-Sandy recovery
efforts in the Rockaways have unfolded in a pre-storm context of
federal and municipal agencies working jointly to strengthen the
socio-ecological systems of the 10,000-acre Jamaica Bay equitably
and sustainably for the working- and middle-class communities
that surround it, with an eye towards potential long-term
residential development in the region. In contrast, the Lower East
Side was swept up in pre- and post-Sandy initiatives to protect the
city’s business and ﬁnancial districts after more than a decade of
rebuilding Lower Manhattan after the terror attacks of September
11, 2001. The “Big U” offered a win-win in protecting the city’s
business and ﬁnancial districts while offering park amenities for
residents in gentrifying neighborhoods across Manhattan’s midtown and downtown neighborhoods.
In this context, resilience – as a new idea and discourse
following a clear sustainability agenda in New York – has been
interpreted, adopted, and mobilized in different ways by the
residents and activists of LES versus Rockaway.
4.2. The “practice” of resilience after Sandy in a context of acute
gentriﬁcation: The Lower East Side
In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, community groups in
LES actively assessed and reﬂected on the recovery process as it
unfolded in NYC, framing demands around a just and equitable
rebuilding of the city. The Alliance for A Just Rebuilding (2014), a
coalition of CBOs, published “Weathering the Storm Rebuilding a
More Resilient New York City Housing Authority Post-Sandy”,
critiquing NYCHA’s abysmal storm response and highlighting the
extensive need for building repairs and worsening of pre-existing
needs: 55% of surveyed apartments had repair needs before Sandy
and 40% had new repair needs after Sandy. 45% of respondents
reported visible mold after Sandy, compared to 34% pre-Sandy.
Some CBOs went further, proactively operationalizing resilience on
the ground.
On the LES, CBOs organized around resilience based on their
experiences with emergency relief and disaster recovery, which, as
one CBO coordinator explained, involved organizing “response
teams [ . . . ] getting outreach and care to” neighbors stuck in highrise apartments without electricity or water. Through Sandy it
became clear that there was an urgent need for community
engagement and organization for resilience and disaster preparedness for low-income residents, despite CBOs’ lack of prior
experience on these issues. Many CBOs intuitively pursued their
own resilience work as they provided emergency relief, quickly
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adopting climate adaptation and disaster preparedness agendas.
An organizer from LES Ready!, a long-term recovery coalition
created after Sandy, explains that several LES CBOs are “naturally”
adding resilience to traditional community work. As a long-term
community leader and organizer from the Lower East Side
explains:
“Many of us have always seen ourselves as an organization that
was ﬁghting greedy landlords and luxury developers from taking
over our community, we never saw a ﬂood, that we would be
ﬁghting the impacts of climate change and sea level rise and storm
surges, we never thought that would be something we would also
be ﬁghting, but after Sandy, it was clear to us that we couldn’t take
these things for granted, so we had to adopt it as an issue and work
on it in a long term way.”
These CBOs were able to adopt resilience as an additional “layer
to help the community.” Since Sandy, CBOs have sustained a
resilience focus by emphasizing disaster preparedness and risk
reduction and connected it to the ability of residents to remain in
their neighborhood.
CBOs on the LES operationalized resilience in three ways after
Sandy: Individual disaster preparedness, collective disaster preparedness, and disaster risk reduction (i.e., ﬂood protection in the
context of large infrastructure construction). Individual disaster
preparedness efforts emphasize training public housing residents
in cooperation with the State of New York. Collective disaster
preparedness efforts focus on inter-organizational coordination
and capacity building for a coordinated community-based disaster
response. For instance, in March 2013, the community organization Good Old Lower East Side (GOLES) led the collective launch of
the Long Term Recovery Group (LTRG) LES Ready!, a coalition of
almost 40 community groups and organizations which has the goal
to “cooperatively coordinate our response, resources, preparedness planning and training in response to Hurricane Sandy and in
the event of future disasters” (LES Ready!, n.d.). The coalition is
working on a community-based disaster preparedness plan for the
LES and has set up inter-organizational emergency communication
protocols. In Sandy’s aftermath, the need for this inter-organizational coordination and communication became clear from the
gaps and overlaps created by ad-hoc, uncoordinated community
responses, as an LES community leader recalls:
“We learned that, when we sent our volunteers to places,
sometimes they already had volunteers. There was so much more
happening that we didn’t really know [ . . . ] We did a tremendous
job, but even with all the work we did, we couldn’t reach everyone.
[ . . . ] We would have to start to think about how we prepare as a
community for these kind of events. It’s bigger than any of us, and
there were lots of groups that weren’t necessarily effectively
communicating with each other. How much more effective could
we be if we coordinated?”
Last, community groups on the LES got involved in governmentled infrastructure projects by advocating how the funding can be
better allocated to projects that serve and beneﬁt the community
itself, and by participating in community outreach. Several LES
Ready! member organizations were engaged in the community
outreach of the 2013 Rebuild by Design (RBD) competition for the
Big U proposal. In general, they publicly supported the project,
mobilized to get support letters from all their elected ofﬁcials, and
testiﬁed during the proposal presentations to the RBD jury. LES
Ready! remains engaged in community outreach for the East Side
Coastal Resiliency (ESCR) project, where several community design
workshops have been held over the last couple of months.
Overall, strong development pressures frame the resilience
work of community organizations in the LES, with residents
concerned about the risk of displacement that resilience measures
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might trigger, fearing that they might be pushed out of their
neighborhood over the mid and long-term because of new real
estate pressures and speculation on the land. Given the changing
demographics of the LES as gentriﬁcation continues apace, CBOs
perceive an acute risk that measures like the ESCR project meant to
increase community resilience will ultimately erode the resilience
of low-income households, including public housing tenants, to
withstand displacement pressures and ﬁnally be pushed out of
their community, as emergent cases of adaptation measures
already reveal in other contexts (Anguelovski et al., 2016). They
fear that “beautifying the waterfront” may bring in new development projects for more privileged residents and accelerate
gentriﬁcation, increasing their risk for displacement. Some
community members even believe that the ESCR project is taking
place precisely because of the advancing gentriﬁcation of the last
decades, arguing that before “nobody wanted to touch the Lower
East Side”. The new infrastructure creates a double-edge sword for
residents and activists by bringing more attention and resources to
the LES but raising the specter of displacement. In the words of a
community leader:
“They want to protect this neighborhood because there is
opportunity for development here. It’s not really about us, it’s
about what’s coming.”
Thus, CBOs are also counter-strategizing around potentially
negative consequences of the ESCR project. They are arguing for
further “soft” resilience measures (Sovacool, 2011), such as storm
water catchment or permeable surfaces, to prevent development
that might undermine community resilience. By complementing
“hard” infrastructure, with “soft” green infrastructure, the resilience of the neighborhood can further be increased, as a
community leader explains:
“We’re trying to ﬁgure out other ways to mitigate the
unintended impacts and that’s why we’re looking at things
like the land right across the street. Can we turn it to storm
water catchment, permeable surfaces? So we can make the
argument it’s not excess land that can be developed on, but that
it has a purpose. Part of the strategy is to use the land to further
mitigate against these further challenges, to make the two
things reliant on each other”
Our interviewee at the Mayor’s Ofﬁce of Recovery & Resilience
strenuously contested the view that development pressures drive
resilience action, arguing instead, as do some community
members, that Sandy’s scale of devastation warranted such a
response. Overall, how the City addresses resilience in the Lower
East Side in the context of development pressures is unclear and
contested, as is the extent to which resilience interventions will
accelerate the already intense gentriﬁcation processes on the
Lower East Side. Research on environmental gentriﬁcation
(Checker, 2011; Curran and Hamilton, 2012; Dale and Newman,
2009) suggests that environmental projects – such as the ESCR
project – can increase property values over the mid-term and
exacerbate pressures on low-income households. However, some
community development advocates highlighted that equitable
resilience measures can address climate gentriﬁcation and
potentially exacerbated inequities, if governmental action balances
investment in resilience infrastructure with investment in affordable housing and locally-owned businesses.
4.3. Lack of post-Sandy resilience organizing in a context of limited
socio-economic opportunities: the Rockaways
Unlike LES organizations’ ability to pivot towards resilience
organizing, Rockaway community groups were unable to mount a
similar response. In Rockaway, underlying pre-storm economic
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needs framed most community responses. As several interviewees
point out, most community groups focus on present needs and
“righting current wrongs” and less on long-term perspectives. As a
city-wide advocate on affordable housing explains, “The Rockaways
was in crisis before Sandy hit, it continues to be in crisis, it’s an
economic crisis. And so the resiliency work doesn’t just sort of happen
in a vacuum, it sits on top of what’s there already in that community”.
In the Rockaways, CBOs are more focused on addressing
vulnerabilities to economic crisis, including problems of unaffordable rents, unemployment, drug abuse, and at-risk youth
all
factors exacerbated after the storm, according to East End
community leaders. Like on the LES, public housing leaders
organized disaster preparedness trainings for their residents. CBOs
also participated in the planning committees of the state’s NY
Rising Community Reconstruction (NYRCR) program, which,
reﬂecting the divisions on the peninsula, were organized for
Rockaway East and Rockaway West. However, in the Rockaways,
there is no collective disaster preparedness or coordination among
different community-based organizations in order to prepare for a
future disaster. In fact, in our 48 interviews there, resilience was
invoked as a recovery topic less than 30% of the time, mainly by
organization leaders, elected ofﬁcials, or city workers. The typical
respondent in our Rockaway sample is not taking about resilience,
and public housing leadership never mentioned it. In one of the
few explicit references to resilience, a Catholic priest ministering to
East End residents, including many undocumented Latinos from
the region, captured how resilience in Rockaway tends to
emphasize socio-economic security, emphasizing “affordable
housing, jobs, better education and youth programs in our community
and building a resiliency community. And so that we will have a better
family, better environment and better social structure.”
Today, Rockaway Beach boardwalk reconstruction dominates
community board meetings and public discussions on the
peninsula, as a perceived critical measure for coastal protection,
community recreation, and local employment. Public housing
residents, community leaders, and CB14 members are pushing to
ensure federal local hiring mandates are fulﬁlled in the boardwalk
project. Good paying, career ladder construction jobs on the
Rockaway Beach boardwalk project embody the type of social
resilience measure residents would like in the community, even if
few of them are explicitly framing them that way.
There is a pervasive discourse in Rockaway that disaster risk
reduction (DRR) measures such as ﬂood protection are a
government responsibility, albeit one that should be inﬂuenced
by community input on coastal protection measures. This
perspective derives from the active presence of government
agencies responsible for Rockaway’s waterfronts, including the
NYC Department of Parks & Recreation that operates Rockaway
Beach; the National Park Service that oversees Ft. Tilden, Jacob Riis
Park, and the Jamaica Bay Gateway National Wildlife Refuge; the U.
S. Army Corps of Engineer’s authority for coastal management and
beach replenishment; and even U.S. Fish & Wildlife’s responsibility
for the protected piping plovers that nest on Rockaway Beach
dunes every spring. Rockaway residents’ lives and relationships to
the coastal environment that deﬁnes life on a peninsula are
structured by an enduring and tense engagement with multiple
agencies that govern these coastal assets and threats (such as
routine bay ﬂooding and occasional but memorable nor’easters
and hurricanes on the peninsula); residents therefore reasonably
expect these entities to provide ﬂood protection, despite residents’
acute understanding of living in a ﬂoodplain.
This emphasis on government responsibility for ﬂood protection and the primacy of the boardwalk as a “hard” protective
measure tends to obscure other environmental risks for residents.
The president of the community board captures this quandary:

“I actually see the [Jamaica] Bay side as the greater threat and
neglected because we know at this point that the ocean side is
going to be cared for between Parks and the Army Corps [ . . . ] on a
daily basis the bay is a threat to residents, where the ocean is the
threat only in the 100 year storm, but [ . . . ] anyone that is on the
bay, is in jeopardy of ﬂooding [ . . . ] It’s complicated because it’s
[Department of Environmental Protection], it’s [Department of
Environmental Conservation], in some cases it’s National Park
Service. What portions are privately owned?   ?A high-tide of a
new moon, everyone gets out their hip boots . . . I think it’s
actually a more complicated situation because of the ecosystem
and the marsh. I think people have just come to accept it as their
life.”
Whereas on the LES, the extent of Sandy’s aftermath may have
been a wake-up call for residents, in Rockaway a varied but
widespread sense of living in delicate balance with the water
already imbues respondents’ lives. As such, Sandy’s impact as a
“focusing event” (Birkland, 1997) for climate adaptation is
dampened, especially in the face of persistent economic malaise
in Far Rockaway.
This impact is further weakened by a lack of cohesive
organizational networks in the Rockaways. As one East End nonproﬁt director explained, there are four to ﬁve active long-term
recovery groups (LTRGs) just in Far Rockaway, reﬂecting weak
coordination and communication capacity and structures complicated by long-standing geographic antipathy:
“there’s Rockaway west and east [ . . . ] they’ve never got along,
but they never really needed a reason to get along. There was
nothing we ever worked on [ . . . now LTRGs are] still working on
their bylaws because there’s just so much conﬂict between all the
residents of different groups, and trying to ﬁgure out who should
have the power . . . ”
Community organizations are therefore moving forward
independently on addressing residents’ socio-economic needs,
many of which Sandy exacerbated. For example, at one East End
food pantry, monthly clients increased from 400 pre-Sandy to 1800
after the storm. An organizer from Rockaway Wildﬁre, an
organization which grew out of collaboration with Occupy Sandy
activists and local residents, highlights the secondary place of
disaster resilience demands in their advocacy efforts for a
Community Beneﬁts Agreement for Arverne East, a large undeveloped site on the peninsula:
“We do have demands in the community beneﬁts agreement
[about resilience] [ . . . ] but for better or worse, they are a lower
priority for people on the Rockaways. [ . . . ] what if before Sandy
you were struggling, you had trouble ﬁnding a job, you had trouble
getting to work. It’s just to say, how bad that Sandy was, for many
people in New York it’s not the worst thing they have experienced”
In summary, in Rockaway, social and economic vulnerabilities
take precedent over long-term disaster resilience for community
groups working with low-income residents. This is in sharp
contrast to the activism of LES Ready! and CBOs on the gentrifying
LES, where they successfully engaged in new resilience work with
and against government-initiated projects.
5. Differentiated sources of community activism for resilience
Essential to our analysis are the different urban growth
dynamics historically and currently underway in the two
communities, especially the process of gentriﬁcation. This section
illuminates the presence and absence of gentriﬁcation in these two
NYC neighborhoods, and the impact of civic infrastructure in
shaping opportunities for community-led resilience to climate
change after Sandy.
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5.1. Dynamics of urban growth and decline: gentriﬁcation as fertile soil
and mobilizing force for community-led resilience
To understand the difference in neighborhood responses in the
aftermath of Sandy, it is necessary to look at the history of urban
development in the Rockaways and the Lower East Side. In three
earlier phases of gentriﬁcation, in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, as
LES residential and commercial rents became unaffordable, artists
and others moved across the East River to “waterfront” Brooklyn
and Queens, and later onward towards “more fringe locations”
(Smith and DeFilippis, 1999). To accomplish his goal of producing
170,000 new units of affordable housing and fulﬁll his “all-out
development policy,” Mayor Bloomberg rezoned 37% of the city
between 2001 and 2013 (Fessenden et al., 2013), with most new
housing on the waterfront, including Rockaway. To date, Rockaway
is one of the few waterfront neighborhoods not (yet) characterized
by intense gentriﬁcation, despite real estate boosters’ best efforts
(Higgins, 2016; see also Logan and Molotch, 1987).
With the transformation of Brooklyn’s East River waterfront
and Lower Manhattan’s Financial District and neighboring Tribeca
into afﬂuent residential communities (Graham, 2007), the LES has
been surrounded by and consumed in a fourth wave of gentriﬁcation (Lees et al., 2008) that captures the luxury development trend
of the Bloomberg Era. Furthermore, his rezoning of the city –
particularly in the outer boroughs – was designed to “reinforce
neighborhood character,” thus “codifying the status quo” in many
communities (Laskow, 2014), keeping pre-existing political power
structures in place and making it harder for newcomers and
marginalized residents to ﬁnd affordable housing or participate in
shaping their neighborhoods. For low-income residents of the LES
steeped in housing activism, this context has helped preserve their
power even as it declines in the face of gentriﬁcation pressures; in
Rockaway, it has meant the West End’s and homeowner’s
disproportionate power endures at the expense of residents in
public housing.
5.1.1. The LES
The Lower East Side has traditionally been a largely workingclass, vibrant immigrant neighborhood which has a rich history of
housing activism (Abu-Lughod, 1994; Mele, 2000). Many community-based organizations ﬁnd their origins in the 1970s, when
widespread abandonment and disinvestment took place in the
Lower East Side, amidst the city’s ﬁscal crisis. Community
members organized to ﬁght economic and racial injustices like
divestment, red lining, arson by landlords and other civil rights
infringements. Although the neighborhood is widely gentriﬁed
today, it remains a diverse and socially dynamic neighborhood to
this day, facilitating the endurance of a strong civic infrastructure.
A wide variety of community-based organizations are still working
on tenants’ rights, homelessness prevention and gentriﬁcation
with deep knowledge, capacity and experience in community
organizing. In the words of a community organizer we interviewed:
“The Lower East Side is more organized, because it’s a small-knit
community, it’s been under attack from gentriﬁcation pretty
publicly and shamelessly for 20 years. And I think that because of
the history of activism and engagement and because of the role
that a lot of resident activists and organizers have had here [ . . . ]
people develop and understand the circumstances to why they are
vulnerable.”
Working on similar issues and being forced to cooperate has
helped create a vibrant, activist neighborhood in the Lower East
Side. Temkin and Rohe (1996, 1998) describe a strong sense of place
attachment and positive place identity as essential to community
efﬁcacy in responding to neighborhood change. This narrative of
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“being organized and strong together” on the LES has strengthened
community identity and action and allowed groups to have a
strong fertile soil to take on additional issues such as disaster
resilience, as a community leader of the Lower East Side explains:
“I think that at different points in time, we had to be really united
and ﬁght a common enemy, other times we fought each other and
in that, there is this hustle and bustle, so I think everybody plays a
role in contributing to this melting pot, to this idea that we are an
organized community”
5.1.2. The Rockaways
The Rockaways development history has been less robust. The
Rockaways’ long decline as a vibrant regional summer retreat was
punctuated by the closure of Rockaway Playland, an amusement
park, in 1982. For many residents, this signaled the demise of the
peninsula. As one public housing tenant leader put it:
“since they took Playland, Rockaway Playland, it has not been the
same. We used to get in groups and walk. We were a lot of people
walking on the boardwalk . . . [Now] kids have nothing to do and
they can’t even walk from 1 corner to the next, somebody’s turf  ?
They were from here, I was from the other side of Rockaway but I
knew who they were. We all hung out. They can’t do that no more.
Her sentiment was conﬁrmed across the peninsula, with a
white homeowner and beach activist from the West End describing
the Playland as ‘amazing’ and a part of the broader wonder of
growing up along the boardwalk; similarly, an African-American
renter and Community Board member from the East End described
Rockaway Playland as a ﬁxture for visitors to the peninsula, who
stopped caring about the place once this destination amusement
park was gone.
In contrast to residents’ sense of nostalgia for Rockaway
Playland is their belief that Rockaway is a “dumping ground” for
unwanted public and institutional uses. Public housing on the
peninsula arrived as a means to provide housing for the poor
displaced by urban renewal by locating it on cheap, underutilized
land at the city’s edge. A Community Board member and Latino
East End resident estimates that in some neighborhoods of the
peninsula there is a nursing home every quarter mile. In
interviews, residents complained about the “derelict hotels” and
“panhandlers” on one of the peninsula’s main commercial strips,
propped up by city support and funding to irresponsible landlords
housing the mentally ill.
This collective identity as the city’s “dumping ground,” as a
place powerless against institutional harm reinforces residents’
sense of physical and social isolation from the rest of the city
(Kaplan and Kaplan, 2003; Lucev, 2007), a socio-spatial distance
exacerbated by anemic economic development well into the 21st
century. Residents described Rockaway as “remote” and “the
boondocks” of the city, characterized by “low density” – not
enough people “to maintain businesses through the winter,”
further marginalized by the toll bridges separating the peninsula
from the rest of the city. The role of government in shaping the
peninsula’s socio-spatial isolation was frequently invoked. The
editor of the local newspaper summed it up:
“The fact that so many poor people are out here, they were placed
as far out on the city edge. Ironically they were pushed out here and
they complicate the resiliency- it’s an economic thing.”
This sense of isolation is complicated by racial and economic
segregation. As an African-American homeowner and community
activist on the East End explained:
“In a community that’s indigent especially in the 101 [precinct on
the East End] it’s totally opposite of the western end [ . . . ] It’s 85%
minority over here. The exact opposite over there as far as
Caucasian and minorities. It’s like night and day, the average dollar
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of the income. You have ﬁve public housing developments on this
Peninsula. That’s big. That’s isolation.”
This pervasive understanding of Rockaway as an isolated,
segregated, left behind district undermined by decades of
economic stagnation stymies residents’ ability to work together
in the face of external challenges, including future disaster
planning and risk reduction. It also depresses their ability to
collectively inﬂuence municipal and institutional actors spearheading Sandy recovery, as Temkin and Rohe (1996, 1998) explain
is crucial for efﬁcacious response to neighborhood change. This is
in sharp contrast to the LES, where low-income residents’ activism
since Sandy builds on their social capital born of their strong
history of organizing in the face of gentriﬁcation and displacement.
5.2. The importance of strong local civic infrastructure for community
resilience practice
Social capital emphasizes the development of trust and what
sociologists call “collective efﬁcacy” (Sampson et al., 2003)
through inter-personal and organizational networks that bond
residents to one another and connect them to extra-local resources
to foster the development of human, political, and economic
capital in marginalized communities. Building social capital to
reconstitute frayed civic and social networks emerged as a critical
opportunity towards the socioeconomic and political revitalization
of low-income urban communities in the 1990s (Keyes et al., 1996;
Gittell and Vidal, 1998; de Souza Briggs, 1998). Urban real estate
development became a critical source of revenue for cash-strapped
cities after two decades of federal devolution (Eisinger, 1998),
aiding the growth of a robust non-proﬁt community development
sector charged with redeveloping low-income urban neighborhoods (Graham, 2015) and building local organizational capacity
and collaboration.
While insightful critiques of the limited utility of social capital
as a community development strategy in the face of powerful
institutional and economic pressures on vulnerable urban poor
communities have since been advanced (See especially DeFilippis,
2001), the concept highlights the importance of strong organizational networks, activism, and external ties to powerful institutions in building community power in local urban development
and their inﬂuence on a community response’s to neighborhood
change (DeFilippis, 2001; Temkin and Rohe, 1996; Temkin and
Rohe, 1998). Community development scholars Lang and Hornburg
(1998) deﬁned the component for operationalizing the trust,
cohesion and connections that constitute neighborhood social
capital as “civic infrastructure,” which is “the network that exists
among local community groups such as community development
corporations (CDCs), foundations, other non-proﬁts, local governments, public housing authorities, businesses, and voluntary associations” (p5). Their conception builds on a civic affairs framework of
civic infrastructure as the “invisible informal and formal networks
and processes through which community problem-solving and
decision-making is carried out” (Parr 1993). Civic infrastructure
shapes the capacities and opportunities of a community to
respond, organize and prepare collectively, such as whether
people on the ground are able to recover quickly after a disaster,
put together a community-based response, and prepare collectively for future events.
Urban development scholars have subsequently demonstrated
that civic infrastructure can be activated by an external crisis or
opportunity (Benjamin-Alvarado et al., 2009), but that it is difﬁcult
to build and sustain through top-down or outside efforts (Gittell
and Vidal, 1998; Traynor, 2007). Traynor argues that civic
infrastructure can take decades to develop organically, and is
increasingly difﬁcult to foster in an era of political polarization and

disengagement. This echoes Lang and Hornburg’s critical caveat to
social capital in community development (1998): “It is far easier to
promote grassroots action in neighborhoods that are already close
than in places where widespread alienation exists.” (p. 7). They
show that race and ethnicity matter, with immigrant and ethnoracial communities correlating with positive factors like multigenerational kin networks and high rates of homeownership as
well as negative inﬂuences like racism, insularity and exclusion.
In the Lower East Side, a strong local civic infrastructure aided
the community and organizational response after Sandy: As
several interviewees point out, the neighborhood is an area rich in
community activity and non-proﬁt work and hence has assembled
wide circles of volunteers in post-Sandy work and beyond. In
contrast, in the Rockaways, the lack of strong social and geographic
connections impeded the access of local residents to much-needed
goods and services, prompting several outside organizations and
networks to move in and provide assistance. As an independent
Occupy Sandy activist recalls:
“I understood intuitively and across the next weeks, how the
patterns of relief were basically following the patterns of access in
different neighborhoods and communities. And so, there was this
perverse effect, whereby people who needed relief the most,
seemed to be getting it the least and so what we did with Occupy
Sandy, we actively tried to combat this, by setting up shop in this
areas, which had less access to relief.”
Due to a strong civic infrastructure, the Lower East Side was
able to engage in long-term community-based disaster preparedness planning and take on additional resilience issues. Mutual trust
and pre-existing connections helped in establishing an effective
disaster preparedness network in the Lower East Side. The
coalition LES Ready! was successful in doing so through the preexisting connections between organizations on the ground, as a
member of LES Ready! explains:
“It was just natural for us to band together. [ . . . ] I know what
everybody does, because of our previous work, our previous
relationships, and I think that’s what makes LES Ready! so
successful, because we have these great relationships, with one
another and we support one another”
In contrast, in Rockaway, interview data reveals that it has been
very difﬁcult to initiate and sustain a similar effort. Instead,
existing community organizations reverted to their traditional and
historical work on socio-economic vulnerability. The limited
capacity for an organic community response such as the one that
occurred on the Lower East Side is due in part to the different civic
infrastructure of the East End community on the peninsula where
poverty, public housing, crime and unemployment are clustered.
Our snowball sampling approach with peninsula community
leaders, which traced civic networks, revealed that East End
respondents were likely to be leaders of faith-based social service
organizations and community development entities and unlikely
to live on the peninsula. This was in contrast to leaders on the more
afﬂuent West End, where civic leaders sat on Community Board 14,
ran local homeowner and resident associations, and generally
drew on their experiences as residents to guide their post-disaster
civic engagement. Although such activists were present on the
Rockaways East End, they kept company in guiding the affairs on
the East End with faith-based, development, and social service
practitioners who served a clientele on the East End rather than
lived among them.
Even within the Rockaways, a “polarity” exists between the
more afﬂuent western and much poorer eastern ends of the
peninsula. As a result, there is a lack of trust and collaboration
between community-based organizations of the Rockaways, as a
member from a local community-based organization testiﬁes:
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“There’s a history of crabs-in-a-barrel type of stuff that happened
in the Rockaways, with people ﬁghting for resources and ﬁghting
for power and not trusting one another and resentment from one
end of the peninsula to the other.”
As previously described, multiple Long Term Recovery Groups
(LTRGs) formed in the Rockaways in the post-Sandy recovery phase
dispersed after internal conﬂicts in which power dynamics and
issues of mistrust prevent them from working together effectively.
6. Conclusion
Due to a lack of empirical studies on community-based
resilience work, including how resilience is operationalized on
the ground, this study sought to investigate how community-based
organizations (CBOs) working for low-income, vulnerable communities “practice” resilience in a post-disaster context; what
social, political, and cultural factors enable and constrain these
CBOs to organize around resilience; and how these practices are
inﬂuenced by urban development dynamics. Our comparative
analysis of the Lower East Side and Rockaway reveals that both the
operationalization of resilience and the community capacity to
organize for resilience are strongly inﬂuenced by pre-existing
urban development constraints, conditions, and by the presence or
absence of a strong civic infrastructure in each neighborhood.
The case of a gentriﬁed and further gentrifying neighborhood
such as the Lower East Side shows the competing, and often
conﬂicting, priorities inherently present in resilience interventions
and how these are embedded in the competitive context of urban
(re)development. In the Lower East Side, resilience is framed by
strong development pressures and the fear of displacement. CBOs
on the LES operationalized resilience through disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction strategies and were able to engage
in additional and new resilience work through the network LES
Ready! and active civic engagement with government-initiated
projects. In contrast, Rockaway CBOs work to decrease the socioeconomic vulnerabilities of their community by contesting preexisting socio-spatial inequities and working on long-standing
economic needs. These present neighborhood conditions not only
restructure resilience conversations but also inﬂuence action on
the ground, and hence point to the essential role political and social
factors play in the ways resilience gets operationalized.
Our study reveals the presence of a dialectical relationship
between urban development dynamics and social capital factors
like civic infrastructure. Civic infrastructure enabled the CBOs of a
diverse, economically dynamic, and socially organized neighborhood such as the LES to engage in long-term community-based
disaster preparedness planning and take on additional resilience
issues, whereas in the Rockaways, the lack of a strong civic
infrastructure hindered such a coordinated community response.
The urban development dynamics and pressures present in the
two neighborhoods inﬂuenced to a large extent the evolution of
the civic infrastructure in the Lower East Side and Rockaway, and
further inﬂuenced the capacity of these communities to organize
and mobilize around resilience.
Organizations are key actors in accessing and controlling capital
in communities (DeFilippis, 2001); any discussion of civic
infrastructure as a factor of community social capital cannot be
divorced from the reality that “communities are outcomes of a
complex set of power-laden relations” and that “certain social
networks are in greater positions of power than others and they
can yield much more substantial returns to their members when
those networks are engaged in social or political conﬂict.” (p. 791).
Furthermore, these networks “operate in the competitive realm of
market relations” (p. 793). The socio-spatial position of the LES
versus Rockaway is dramatically different in NYC’s hyper
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speculative real estate market, creating spatially and temporally
divergent experiences with gentriﬁcation and urban development.
As the LES case illustrates, a long history of organizing against
gentriﬁcation, and the organizational capacity, trust, networks and
institutional access borne from that ﬁght makes local CBOs key
stakeholders and drivers of the local resilience response after
Sandy, as the geographically central and economically vibrant
neighborhood undergoes the latest round of gentriﬁcation as well
as grand scale resilience infrastructure efforts. The history of the
Lower East Side is thus complicated for community activists in the
context of climate-related disaster events, as historical struggles
and threats helped organize a community that is now building on
these tensions of resilience.
In contrast, Rockaway is characterized by economic malaise,
socio-spatial isolation from municipal political and economic
power structures, and weak organizational capacity and networks
among a racially and economically stratiﬁed community with a
profound sense of powerless in the face of institutional threat.
Many residents hope Sandy has ﬁnally put Rockaway “on the map,”
with recovery monies reinvigorating the modest economic
development underway in the peninsula prior to Sandy, with
some indication that this is happening. Yet, given the institutional
and urban development dynamics described at length in this
analysis, the framework of and mobilization around resiliency lags
in Rockaway, as residents struggle with more pressing socioeconomic concerns exacerbated by Sandy’s devastating storm
surge.
As the concept of (urban) resilience continues to gain popularity
and more municipalities are engaging in urban resilience
interventions and adaptation planning, further research is needed
to assess how community-based organizations can be supported in
resilience efforts and how unintended consequences of resilience
interventions might exacerbate or create new socio-spatial
inequities. The respective cases of community resilience work
on the Lower East Side and in Rockaway offer several insights to
guide future inquiries. First, we illustrate how community-based
organizations try to balance the trade-offs of urban resilience
interventions in the face of development pressures and gentriﬁcation, navigating the tensions that arise from participating in
government-initiated resilience work. Alternatively, communitybased organizations may lack the “beneﬁt” of gentriﬁcation
pressure to develop the capacity and power to shape the resiliency
of their communities in a world transformed by climate change.
We encourage research on other post-Sandy initiatives to test our
ﬁndings on community resilience practices. Finally, scholars and
policymakers have much more to learn about the long-term
growth and perseverance of strong community resilience networks and their role as meaningful stakeholders in building
resilient communities, especially if gentriﬁcation patterns displace
long-standing residents or prevent future generations from
building on their legacy of community activism.
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Appendix A.
See Fig. A1.

Fig. A1. Map of NYC Community Districts.
Source: NYC Department of City Planning. Manhattan Community District 3 (blue) includes the Lower East Side. Queens Community District 14 (purple) includes Rockaway.
(The green in CD14 is national parkland.).
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